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Abstract

Cloud computing offers different types of computational services to end users via
computer networks. Nowadays it has become a trend that individuals and IT enterprises store data remotely to the cloud in a flexible on-demand manner, which
has become a popular way of data outsourcing. This has reduced the burden for
storage management and maintenances and costs on hardware and software, with
great advancement of universal data access and convenience to users. In fact, cloud
storage has become one of the major services in cloud computing where user data
are stored and maintained by cloud servers. It allows users to access their data via
computer networks at anytime and from anywhere.
Despite the great benefits provided by cloud computing, data security is a very
important yet challenging problem that must be solved. One of the major concerns
of data security is data integrity in a remote storage system. Although storing data
in the cloud is attractive, it does not usually offer any guarantee on data integrity
and retrievability.
Unfortunately, many Remote Integrity Checking (RIC) schemes in the literature
are insecure. In this thesis, we will provide a cryptanalysis against a well-known RIC
scheme. Our analysis approach can also be applied to other similar RIC schemes.
We also provide a solution to the problem.
It is also very important that an auditing process should not introduce new vulnerabilities of unauthorized information leakage towards their data security. The
previous efforts in RIC accommodate several security features including data integrity and confidentiality, which mainly ensure secure maintenance of data. However, they do not cover the issue of data privacy, which means that the communication flows (RIC proofs) from the cloud server should not reveal any useful information to the adversary. Intuitively, by “privacy”, we mean that an adversary should
not be able to distinguish which file has been uploaded by the client and maintained

v

by the cloud server. We refer it as Indistinguishability (or IND, for short). We believe that it is very important to consider such privacy issues adequately in protocol
designs. We refer to this security property as IND-privacy.
In this thesis, we also provide the definition of data privacy for RIC protocols
and demonstrate how data privacy can be achieved. We demonstrate that a wellknown privacy-preserving RIC protocol do not provide IND-Privacy. Actually, we
can conclude that all current RIC protocols do not provide IND-privacy. We also
show that with a witness distinguishability proof, we are able to achieve IND-Privacy
in RIC. As a instantiation, we present a concrete RIC protocol, which capture the
security property of IND-privacy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Background

Cloud computing is a general term for anything that involves delivering hosted service over the Internet. Cloud computing has gained its popularity and has been
widely applied to various computing fields because of its convenience. As long as
users login on a cloud service with their user names and passwords, they can commit their computing task in the cloud. Cloud services can be broadly divided into
three categories: Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS)
and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Could computing has been well developed, with
various services for a variety of applications such as storage services, virtual machines, database servers, etc. The major benefit from cloud computing has been
well recognised in that it has showed great flexibility in computing, mobility of data
access, cost reduction of managing data and services, etc.
As one of major service in cloud computing, cloud storage has been the most
popular application adopted by almost all kinds of computing devices. In fact,
it has become a trend that individuals and IT enterprises store data remotely to
the cloud in a flexible on-demand manner, which has become a popular way of data
outsourcing. This has reduced the burden for storage management and maintenances
and costs on hardware and software, with great advancement of universal data access
and convenience to users. In fact, cloud storage has become one of the major services
in cloud computing where user data are stored and maintained by cloud servers.
It allows users to access their data via computer networks at anytime and from
anywhere.
Although the great advantage of cloud storage, security is still a major challenge.
There are two major concerns on security which have been critical to the success
of cloud storage systems. The first one is data security, which generally addresses
1
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the issues of confidentiality and authenticity. It can usually be solved by using
traditional cryptographic approaches. The second concern is about data integrity
(e.g., [36, 2, 32]), which mainly concerns about whether the original files being kept
well by the cloud server. Hashing and digital signatures can be adopted to measure
to verify data integrity. However, the integrity requirement of cloud data require
special treatments, because the following reasons. Since cloud server is generally
regarded as untrusted, the adversary model should capture malicious cloud servers.
It is also due to public verifiability, where means that the integrity proof from the
cloud server is able to be checked by a third party, who has no knowledge about
the stored data. One of the solutions to this issue aims to provide an efficient and
secure method to allow a third party auditor (TPA) to check if the data item has
been well maintained, i.e., the integrity of the data is ensured. As the data item is
stored in the cloud, it is generally referred to as Remote Integrity Checking (RIC).
A major challenge to RIC is the data confidentiality and privacy of data against
potential adversary who might be interested in the information of the stored data
item. Depending on the security model, the adversary could be an eavesdropper,
a malicious TPA or a malicious cloud server. In general, we should not allow the
TPA to know the content of the stored data item, while an RIC procedure is being
conducted. The difficulty is also due to the full control of the cloud server to the
storage.
There are a number of proposed solutions which have been published in the
literature. However, they are far from adequate to address the problem related to
RIC. The work presented in this thesis provides a substantial contribution to RIC
solutions and a critical foundation and security models to RIC systems.

1.2

Previous Solutions

The research of RIC is much boarder than RIC itself. Simple data integrity check
in a remote data storage can be done by periodically examining the data files stored
on the cloud server, but such an approach can be very expensive if the amount of
data is huge. An interesting problem is to check data integrity remotely without the
need of accessing the full copy of data stored on the cloud server. For example, the
data owner possesses some verification token (e.g. a digest of the data file [18, 23,
5]), which is very small compared with the stored dataset. Several cryptographic
notions can also be associated to RIC. The notion of Proof of Retrievability (POR)
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[31, 42, 12, 20] is a primitive, which addresses data retrievability. However, RIC and
POR are two different concepts, which serve to different purposes though they have
some similarity. The other well-know notion is Proof of Data Ownership (PDP)
[18, 23, 5]. Again, RIC and PDP are different concepts, while they have some
similarity, especially when the cloud server acts as the prover.
POR is, loosely speaking, a kind of Proof of Knowledge (POK) [7] where the
knowledge is the data file. However, as pointed out in [31], in a POR, unlike a
POK, neither the prover nor the verifier need actually have knowledge of the file F .
Recently, there are a number of RIC research papers (e.g.,[45, 47, 44]), which have
misused the concept of POR and treated it as the same as RIC. This unfortunately
caused the failure of many RIC schemes in the literature. One of errors made was
due to wrongly applying the POR concept [42] to RIC. One of examples is the RIC
scheme recently proposed by Wang et al. [44]. To able to correctly adopt a POR
scheme to RIC, we must correctly define the security model, which captures the
goal of RIC (and POR). RIC requires that the data stored in the cloud server to
be well maintained, which means that it will be regarded as a failure, if a file F
is changed to F 0 = F + ∆, while the prover (cloud server) is still able to prove its
integrity. However, POR has a different definition. The goal of POR is to prove
the stored file is retrievable by the user. This means that as long as the file can be
retrieved, the file can be stored in any form. For example, if the cloud server holds
F 0 and ∆, then it should be able to prove the the file can be retrieved by the user.
Another example is due to Juel and Kaliski Jr. [31], where they encrypts file F and
randomly embeds a set of randomly-valued check blocks called sentinels. The use of
encryption here renders the sentinels indistinguishable from other file blocks. The
verifier challenges the prover by specifying the positions of a collection of sentinels
and asking the prover to return the associated sentinel values. If the prover has
modified or deleted a substantial portion of F , then with high probability it will
also have suppressed a number of sentinels. This model obviously differs from the
RIC model.
Provable Data Procession (PDP) [3] has been seen as a close analog to the
RIC. It allows a client that has stored data at an untrusted server to verify that the
server possesses the original data without retrieving it. The model of PDP addresses
probabilistic proofs of possession by sampling random sets of file blocks from the
server. The client maintains a constant amount of metadata, which can be used to
verify the proof. The PDP model for remote data checking usually supports large
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data sets in distributed storage systems. If we regard the PDP prover is the cloud
data server, then it can be considered as an RIC procedure. However, RIC covers
wider aspects including public verifiability and privacy (we all elaborate more about
this later). Therefore, PDP is usually retreated as a separate topic.
An interesting problem is to check data integrity remotely without storing the
data locally. This approach is also referred to as client-side deduplication. This
makes data management more challenging, as clients do not have backups of the
data. A failure of the data server inevitably leads to data loss or illegal disclosure;
hence, providing new and innovative solutions to these issues is critical to cloud
computing. In addition, the cloud storage operator would like to store a single copy
of each file, regardless of how many clients ask to store that file. This is referred to as
server-side deduplication, or cross-user deduplication. This technique is particularly
important given the increase of the data volume as well as the demand for online
storage services. Providing a remote integrity check whilst retaining client-side
deduplication and server-side deduplication will be desirable, as it greatly reduces
the risk of data loss. Unfortunately, to date, there exists no single unified model
that completely captures all the requirements of remote integrity checks in cloud
storage.

1.3

Motivation and Contributions

As mentioned earlier, the proofs of remote data retrievability have been wrongly
applied to RIC by several authors. However, the definitions of retrievability and
RIC are entirely different. In a retrievability proof, the verifier’s or user’s goal is
to prove that the stored file can be retrieved, whether or not the file is modified by
the adversary (the cloud server, for example). RIC defines an entirely different goal:
the verifier or user must be able to confirm that the file stored in the data storage
system has not been modified or altered.
Demonstrating this using Shacham and Waters POR scheme [42]. We found
that the linear property of the homomorphic authenticators is subject to a trivial
attack when it is applied to RIC, while the scheme is perfect for data retrieval. The
P
mechanism of the attack is as follows. Let us assume that ni=0 ai xi is a (public)
linear homomorphic function, in which ai denotes coefficients and xi variables related
to the stored dataset. To launch an attack, the adversary appends a value α so that
P
it becomes ni=0 ai xi + α, which is still a linear homomorphic function. Clearly, α
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stems from the change to the stored dataset {xi }. When it is applied to a data
retrievability proof, the adversary (usually, the cloud server) manipulates the data
flow sent to the user (verifier) so that the adversary can remove the components that
were generated due to α in response of a user query. Therefore, the user can still
retrieve the correct dataset using an extractor defined in their algorithm. However,
the integrity of the stored dataset has been broken. We found that there is no trivial
solution to this problem that maintains data retrievability.
In this thesis, we will domesticate this type of flaws by using a typical example
[44]. Our cryptanalysis provided in this thesis can also been applied to other similar
RIC protocols which are based on the notion of POR.
It is also very important that an auditing process should not introduce new
vulnerabilities of unauthorized information leakage towards their data security [43].
The previous efforts in RIC accommodate several security features including data
integrity and confidentiality, which mainly ensure secure maintenance of data. However, they do not cover the issue of data privacy, which means that the communication flows (RIC proofs) from the cloud server should not reveal any useful information to the adversary. Intuitively, by “privacy”, we mean that an adversary should
not be able to distinguish which file has been uploaded by the client and maintained
by the cloud server. We refer it as Indistinguishability (or IND, for short). We believe that it is very important to consider such privacy issues adequately in protocol
designs.
We show that the privacy property can be proved with formal proofs of indistinguishability (IND) that can be formalised by an IND game between a prover and
a verifier, and we found that none of the RIC schemes in the literature capture
the IND property. We refer this IND property as IND-privacy. Again, with the
RIC scheme in [44] as an example, we demonstrate that it does not capture the
IND-privacy.
The existing RIC protocols reveal some information on target file whose integrity
is proved by the cloud server. Therefore, the IND adversary is able to distinguish
two different files target in an RIC proof. We show that the IND-privacy can be
achieved by using the Witness Indistinguishable (WI) proof to mask an RIC proof
from the cloud server. That is, the cloud server proves by zero knowledge that
it knows the RIC proof without revealing the actual proof to the adversary. We
provide a concrete example by using the RIC scheme in [44]. We proved that the
IND-privacy has indeed achieved when the WI proof is applied to the scheme.

1.4. Organisation of This Thesis

1.4
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Organisation of This Thesis

This thesis consists of six chapters. The highlight of this work is twofold: cryptanalysis of the RIC scheme in [44] and introduction of the new notion of IND-privacy.
Apart from this chapter, we provide a brief outline of each chapter in following.
In Chapter 2, we describe some preliminaries, which will be applied to our
schemes. It includes the number theoretical notions, complexity assumptions, digital
signatures and encryption, and other cryptographic tools.
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive review of related work. We start by describing the security requirements associated with RIC, POR and PDP, which are then
revisited in terms of their security models.
In Chapter 4, we present a rigorous cryptanalysis on Wang et al.’s RIC protocol
[44]. We found that their protocol is flawed and does not meet their security assumptions, which means that the adversary can modify any file stored in the cloud
server and the cloud server can still prove the integrity of the file. We demonstrate
our attacks based on two attacking scenarios and show the detail flaws under our
attacks.
We found that RIC privacy was not adequately studied in the literature and
believed that it should be captured in all RIC protocols. In Chapter 5, we introduce
the new notion of IND-privacy, which provides a clear and sound definition of RIC
privacy. Our privacy definition is essential for RIC protocols. We also provide a
comprehensive cryptanalysis of the RIC scheme in [44]. We show that the RIC
scheme in [44] does not capture IND-privacy. Therefore, we provide a novel method
to repair these flawed protocols by using WI proofs. We prove that our new protocol
indeed provide IND-privacy. Our solution can be also applied to other RIC protocols.
In Chapter 6, We conclude this thesis and discuss some future work.

Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we describe some related cryptographic definitions and tools we will
use in this thesis.

2.1

Foundations of Algebra

In this section, we revisit some basic algebra definitions including group and field.

Group
A group consists of a set of elements and an operation which is executed between
any two elements in the set. The formal definition of a group is described as follows:

Definition 2.1 (Group) A group (G, ⊗) is a set G equipped with an operation ⊗,
and satisfies the following properties:
1. Closure. For all g, h ∈ G, g ⊗ h ∈ G;
2. Associativity. For all g, h, η ∈ G, (g ⊗ h) ⊗ η = g ⊗ (h ⊗ η);
3. Identity. There exists 1G ∈ G called the identity of (G, ⊗), such that 1G ⊗ g =
g ⊗ 1G = g for all g ∈ G;
4. Inverse. For all g ∈ G, there exists g −1 ∈ G called the inverse of g such that
g ⊗ g −1 = g −1 ⊗ g = 1G .
For simplicity, a group (G, ⊗) is often denoted as G when the operation ⊗ is
clear. The number of the elements in G is called the order of G and denoted as |G|.
A group G is a finite group if |G| is finite; otherwise, it is an infinite group. A group
G is an Abelian group if for all g, h ∈ G, g ⊗ h = h ⊗ g.

7
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Let G(1` ) be a group generator which takes as input 1` and outputs a group G
with order p, namely G(1` ) → (p, G).
Definition 2.2 (Order of Group Element) Suppose that g ∈ G, the order of g in G
is the least i ∈ Z+ such that g i = 1G . If for all i ∈ Z+ , g i 6= 1G , the order of g is
infinite. The order of g is denoted as ord(g).
Especially, if any element in a group G can be expressed by a specially element
in G, G is called as a cyclic group. The formal definition of a cyclic group is as
follows:
Definition 2.3 (Cyclic Group.) A group G is a cyclic group if there exists g ∈ G,
for all h ∈ G, there exists i ∈ Z such that h = g i . The element g is called as a
generator of the group G. G is said to be generated by g and denoted as G = hgi.

Field
A field consists of a set of elements and two operations defined between any two
elements in the set. The formal definition of a field is described as follows.
Definition 2.4 (Field) A field (F, ⊕, ⊗) consists of a set F and two operations:
addition ⊕ and multiplication ⊗, and satisfies the following properties.
1. Addition Group. (F, ⊕) is an Abelian group. The identity of the group (F, ⊕)
is denoted as 0F and called additive identity or zero-element;
2. Multiplication Group. Let F∗ = F − {0F }. (F∗ , ⊗) is an Abelian group. The
identity of the group (F∗ , ⊗) is denoted as 1F and called as multiplicative identity;
3. Distributivity. For all g, h, η ∈ F, (g ⊕ h) ⊗ η = (g ⊗ η) ⊕ (h ⊗ η).

2.2

Bilinear Groups

In this section, we review the knowledge related to bilinear group.
Definition 2.5 (Bilinear Map [10]) Suppose that G1 , G2 and GT are three cyclic
groups with the same order p. Let g and h be the generators of G1 and G2 , respectively. A bilinear map (pairing) is a map e : G1 × G2 → GT satisfying the following
properties :
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1. Bilinearity. For all x ∈ G1 , y ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp , e(xa , y b ) = e(x, y)ab .
2. Non-degeneracy. e(g, h) 6= 1GT where 1GT is the identity of the group GT .
3. Computability. For all x ∈ G1 and y ∈ G2 , there exists an efficient algorithm
to compute e(x, y).
Definition 2.6 (Bilinear Groups [25]) G1 , G2 , and GT constitute a bilinear group
if there exists a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT , where |G1 | = |G2 | = |GT | = p.
Galbraith, Paterson and Smart [25] divided pairing operations used in cryptography into three types:
1. G1 = G2 ;
2. G1 6= G2 , there exists an efficiently computable homomorphism map ψ : G1 →
G2 ;
3. G1 6= G2 , there are no efficiently computable homomorphism maps between
groups G1 and G2 .
We say that a pairing is symmetric if G1 = G2 and denote the symmetric bilinear
group as (e, p, G1 , GT ). Pairing is often constructed on suitable elliptic curves, so
its efficiency is determined by the selected elliptic curves. When selecting elliptic
curves for a pairing, two factors must be considered: the group size l of the elliptic
curves and the embedding degree d. Generally, to achieve the security of 1, 024-bit
RSA, the two parameters l and d should satisfy l × d ≥ 1, 024 [33, 13]. The security
parameter ` must be large enough (say, at least 2160 ) so that the discrete logarithm
problem in groups G1 and G2 is hard. The embedding degree d should not be too
large (less than or equal to 50) so that the bilinear maps can be computable.
In the rest of this thesis, we denote GG(1` ) → (e, p, G1 , G2 , GT ) as a bilinear group
generator which takes as input 1` and outputs bilinear groups (e, p, G1 , G2 , GT ) with
order p and a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT .

2.3

Complexity Assumptions

In this section, we review the complexity assumptions used throughout this thesis.

Discrete Logarithm Assumption
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The discrete logarithm (DL) assumption [38] in a finite field is one of the basic
assumptions in cryptography research. The DL assumption is defined as follows.
Definition 2.7 (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption [38].) Let G(1` ) → (p, G)
and G = hgi. Given (g, y) ∈ G2 , we say that the discrete logarithm assumption
holds on G if no PPT adversary A can compute a x ∈ Zp such that y = g x with the
advantage
DL
AdvA
= Pr [y = g x |A(p, g, y, G) → x] ≥ (`)

where the probability is taken over the random choice of y ∈ G and the bits consumed
by the adversary A.

Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Diffie and Hellman [19] proposed this assumption and constructed a key exchange
scheme based on it. This assumption is defined as follows.
R

Definition 2.8 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption [19].) Let x, y ←
Zp , G(1` ) → (p, G) and G = hgi. Given (g, g x , g y ), we say that the computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption holds on G if no PPT adversary A can compute g xy with
the advantage
CDH
AdvA
= Pr [A(g, g x , g y ) → g xy ] ≥ (`)
R

where the probability is taken over the random choices of x, y ← Zp and the bits
consumed by the adversary A.
Maurer [35] discussed the relationships between DL assumption and CDH assumption.

Decisional Diflie-Hellman Assumption
Boneh [9] surveyed the various applications of decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and demonstrated some results regarding it security.
R

Definition 2.9 (Decisional Diflie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption [9].) Let x, y, z ←
Zp , G(1` ) → (p, G) and G = hgi. Given (g, g x , g y ), we say that the decisional DiffieHellman assumption holds on G if no PPT adversary A can distinguish (X, Y, Z) =
(g x , g y , g xy ) from (X, Y, Z) = (g x , g y , g z ) with the advantage
DDH
AdvA
= |Pr[A(X, Y, g xy ) = 1] − Pr[A(X, Y, g z ) = 1]| ≥ (`)
R

where the probability is taken over the random choices x, y, z ← Zp and the bits
consumed by the adversary A.
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Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Boneh and Franklin [10] introduced this assumption. This assumption is as
follows.
Definition 2.10 (Computational Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (CBDH) Assumption [10])
Let GG(1` ) → (e, p, G, GT ) and G = hgi. We say that the computational bilinear
Diffie-Hellman assumption holds on (e, p, G, GT ) if no PPT adversaries A can compute e(g, g)abc from (A, B, C) = (g a , g b , g c ) with the advantage


CBDH
= Pr A(A, B, C) → e(g, g)abc ≥ (`)
AdvA
R

where the probability is taken over the random choices of a, b, c ← Zp and the bits
consumed by A.

Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Boneh and Franklin [10] introduced this assumption and used it to construct an
identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. This assumption is defined as follows.
Definition 2.11 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption [10])
R

Let a, b, c, z ← Zp , GG(1` ) → (e, p, G, GT ) and G = hgi. We say that the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption holds on (p, e, G, GT ) if no PPT adversary A can distinguish (A, B, C, Z) = (g a , g b , g c , e(g, g)abc ) from (A, B, C, Z) =
(g a , g b , g c , e(g, g)z ) with the advantage
DBDH
AdvA
= Pr[A(A, B, C, e(g, g)abc ) = 1] − Pr[A(A, B, C, e(g, g)z ) = 1] ≥ (`)
R

where the probability is taken over the random choices of a, b, c, z ← Zp and the bits
consumed by the adversary A.

Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption [29] is defined as
follows.
Definition 2.12 (Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption [29]) Let x, y, z
R

← Zp , GG(1` ) → (e, p, G1 , G2 , GT ) and Gb = hgb i for any b ∈ {1, 2}. We say
that the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption holds on (p, e, G1 , G2 , GT )
if no PPT adversary A can distinguish (gb , gbx , gby , gbxy ) from (gb , gbx , gby , gbz ) with the
advantage
SXDH
AdvA
= |Pr[A(gb , gbx , gby , gbxy ) = 1] − Pr[A(gb , gbx , gby , gbz ) = 1]| ≥ (`)
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R

where the probability is taken over the random choices of x, y, z ← Zp and the bits
consumed by the adversary A.

2.4

Cryptographical Tools

In this section, we introduce some useful cryptographical tools, including hash
function, random oracle model, public-key encryption, digital signature and zeroknowledge proof.

2.4.1

Hash Function

Carter and Wegman [15] introduced the universal classes of hash functions and
divided them into tree types. Roughly speaking, a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}λ is a deterministic function which can map a bit string with any length to
a bit string with fixed length λ. A hash function should provide the following
properties [34]:
1. Mixing Transformation. The output of H should be computationally indistinguishable from a uniform binary string in [0, 2λ ];
2. Pre-image Resistance. Given a value y, it is computationally infeasible to find
a value x such that y = H(x);
3. Collusion Resistance. It is computationally infeasible to find x 6= y such that
H(x) = H(y).
Hash function is an important cryptographical primitive and has been used as a
building block to design encryption scheme [24], digital signature scheme [8], message
authentication code (MAC) scheme [6], etc.

2.4.2

Random Oracle Model

A hash function should satisfy the mixing transformation property, namely the
output of a hash function is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform
distribution over its output’s space. If the output of a hash function is uniform
distribution over its output’s space, it is a very powerful and ideal hash function
called random oracle [34]. A random oracle is a powerful hash function as it combines
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the properties: deterministic, efficient and uniform output. Furthermore, a random
oracle is an ideal hash function as there are no so powerful computing mechanism
or machinery in current computing models.
Bellare and Rogaway [8] introduced the notion of random oracle model. In this
model, a special entity called Simulator can simulate every party’s behavior. So,
whenever a party wants to obtain the output of a random oracle H on a value x, he
must make a random oracle query on the value x to the Simulator. Simulator maintains a H-table consisting of pairs (z, H(z)). For a query on the value x, Simulator
checks whether x is listed in the table. If it has been in the table, Simulator responds
with the value H(x) (deterministic); otherwise, Simulator creates a new value H(x)
uniformly at random from the output’s space of H, adds the pair (x, H(x)) to the
table and responds with H(x) (uniform).
Random oracle model is a very efficient tool to prove the security of cryptographic
protocols. Generally, protocols designed in this model are more efficient than those
designed in standard model. Whereas, a scheme which is proven to be secure in the
random oracle model does not necessarily imply that it is secure in the standard
model [14].
Unless otherwise specified, by saying a scheme is secure, we mean that it is secure
in the standard model in this thesis.

2.4.3

Public-Key Encryption

Diffie and Hellman [19] introduced new research directions in cryptography called
public-key cryptography (PKC) where two parties can communicate over public channels without compromising the security of the system.
A public-key (asymmetric) encryption (PKE) scheme is a public-key cryptographic scheme used to protect the confidentiality of the transferred massages. In a
PKE scheme, a secret-public key pair is generated. Notably, it is computationally
infeasible to obtain the secret key from the public key. This is in contrast with a
symmetric encryption scheme where both the decryption key and the encryption
key are same or it is easy to compute one from the other.
The formal definition of a PKE scheme is as follows [19]. A PKE scheme consists
of the following four algorithm.
Setup(1` ) → params. The setup algorithm takes as input 1` and outputs the public
parameters params.
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KeyGen(1` ) → (SK, P K). The key generation algorithm takes as input 1` and
outputs a secret-public pair KG(1` ) → (SK, P K).
Enc(params, P K, M ) → CT. The encryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters params, the public key P K and a message M , and outputs a
ciphertext CT .
Dec(params, SK, CT ) → M. The decryption algorithm takes as input the public
parameters params, the secret key SK and the ciphertext CT , and outputs
the message M .
Definition 2.13 Correctness. We say that a public-key encryption scheme is correct
if


Setup(1` ) → params;


`
Pr 
 Dec(params, SK, CT ) → M KeyGen(1 ) → (SK, P K);

Enc(params, P K, M ) → CT



=1


where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by all algorithms in
the scheme.
Security Model. The standard notion of the security for a PKE scheme is called indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) [39]. This
model is defined by the following game executed between a challenger C and an
adversary A.
Setup. C runs Setup(1` ) to generate the public parameters params and sends them
to A.
KeyGen. C runs KeyGen(1` ) to generate the secret-public key pair (SK, P K) and
sends the public key P K to A.
Phase 1. A can adaptively query the decryption oracle. A submits a ciphertext
CT to C, where CT = Enc(param, P K, M ). C runs Dec(params, SK, CT )
and responds A with M . This query can be made multiple times.
Challenger. A submits two messages M0 and M1 with equal length. C randomly
selects Mb and computes CT ∗ = Enc(params, P K, Mb ), where b ∈ {0, 1}. C
responds A with CT ∗ .
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Phase 2. A can adaptively query the decryption oracle. A submits a ciphertext
CT to C, where the only restrict is CT 6= CT ∗ . Phase 1 is repeated. This
query can be made multiple times.
Guess. A outputs his guess b0 on b. A wins the game if b0 = b.
Definition 2.14 IND-CCA2. We say that a public-key encryption scheme is (T, q,
(`))-indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) if no
PPT adversary A making q decryption queries can win the game with the advantage
IN D−CCA2
AdvA
= Pr[b0 = b] −

1
≥ (`)
2

in the above model.
Another security notion for public-key encryption is called indistinguishability
against adaptive chosen plaintex attacks (IND-CPA). In this model, the adversary
A is not allowed to query the decryption oracle. The formal definition for this model
is as follows.
Definition 2.15 IND-CPA. We say that a public-key encryption scheme is (T, (`))indistinguishable against adaptive chosen plaintex attacks (IND-CPA) if no PPT
adversary A who is restricted to query the decryption oracle can win the game with
the advantage
IN D−CP A
AdvA
= Pr[b0 = b] −

1
≥ (`)
2

in the above model.
Some well known PKE schemes include the ElGamal encryption scheme [21],
RSA encryption scheme [40], Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [17] and RSA-OAEP
encryption scheme [24].

2.4.4

Digital Signature

Digital signature was proposed by Diffie and Hellman [19]. It is the electronic version
of a handwritten signature. A valid digital signature can convince a verifier that it
was generated by a known party for a public message. Especially, a digital signature
can provide non-repudiation property, namely a signer cannot deny he has generated
the signature.
A digital signature scheme is formally defined as follows [28]. It consists of the
following four algorithms.
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Setup(1` ) → params. The setup algorithm takes as input 1` and outputs the public
parameters params.
KeyGen(1` ) → (SK, P K). The key generation algorithm takes as input 1` and
outputs a secret-public key pair (SK, P K).
Sign(params, SK, M ) → σ. The signature algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, the secret ky SK and a message M , and outputs a signature
σ on M .
Verify(params, M, P K, σ) → T rue/F alse. The verification algorithm takes as input the public parameters params, the message M , the public key P K and
the signature σ, and outputs T rue if Sign(params, M, SK) → σ; otherwise, it
outputs F alse.
Definition 2.16 Correctness. We say that a digital signature is correct if


Setup(1` ) → params;


`
 ≥ 1 − (`)
Pr 
Verify(params,
M,
P
K,
σ)
→
T
rue
KeyGen(1
)
→
(SK,
P
K);


Sign(params, SK, M ) → σ.
and


`



Setup(1 ) → params;



Pr  Verify(params, M, P K, σ) → F alse KeyGen(1` ) → (SK, P K); 
 < (`)
Sign(params, SK, M ) → σ.

where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by all algorithms in
the scheme.
Security Model. A digital signature scheme should achieve the traditional security
called existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-CMA)
[28]. This model is formally defined by the following game executed between a
challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup. C runs Setup(1` ) to generate the public parameters params and sends them
to A.
KeyGen. C runs KeyGen(1` ) to generate a secret-public pair (SK, P K) and sends
P K to A.
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Query. A can adaptively query the signature oracle. A sends a message M to C.
C runs Sign(params, SK, M ) to generate a signature σ on M and responds A
with σ. This query can be made multiple times.
Output. A outputs a message-signature pair (M ∗ , σ ∗ ). A wins the game if M ∗ has
not been used to query the signature oracle and Verify(params, M ∗ , P K, σ ∗ ) →
T rue.
Definition 2.17 EU-CMA. We say that a digital signature scheme is (T, q, (`))existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-CMA) if no
PPT adversary A can win the game with the advantage
EU −CM A
AdvA
= Pr [Verify(params, M ∗ , P K, σ ∗ ) → T rue] ≥ (`)

in the above model.
An, Dodis and Rabin [1] proposed a stronger definition for the security of digital
signature schemes called strongly existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen
message attack (SEU-CMA). This model is defined by the following game executed
between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Setup. C runs Setup(1` ) to generate the public parameters params and sends them
to A.
KeyGen. C runs KeyGen(1` ) to generate a secret-public pair (SK, P K) and sends
P K to A.
Query. A can adaptively query the signature oracle. A adaptively sends messages
{M1 , M2 , · · · , Mq } to C. C runs Sign(params, SK, Mi ) to generate a signature
σi on Mi and responds A with σi , for i = 1, 2, · · · , q.
Output. A outputs a message-signature pair (M ∗ , σ ∗ ). A wins the game if (M ∗ , σ ∗ )
∈
/ {(M1 , σ1 ), (M2 , σ2 ), · · · , (Mq , σq )} and Verify(params, M ∗ , P K, σ ∗ ) → T rue.
Definition 2.18 SEU-CMA. We say that a digital signature scheme is (T, q, (`))strongly existentially unforeable against adaptive chosen message attacks (SEU-CMA)
if no PPT adversary A can win the game with the advantage
SEU −CM A
AdvA
= Pr [Verify(params, M ∗ , P K, σ ∗ ) → T rue] ≥ (`)

in the above model.
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Zero-Knowledge Proof

Introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [27], a zero-knowledge proof is an
interactive protocol which can be used by a prover to convince a verifier that a
statement is true without releasing any more information than the validity of the
statement. A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZK-PoK) is a protocol which can
be used by a prover to convince a verifier that he knows a secret value without the
verifier knowing anything about the value. There are two parties in a zero-knowledge
proof: a prover P which has unlimited computation ability and a verifier V which
is computationally bound. By (P ↔ V)[x], we denote that P proves to V that the
statement x is correct. The formal definition for a perfect zero-knowledge proof [26]
is as follows.
Definition 2.19 A pair (P ↔ V) is an interactive proof system for a language L
if the following properties can be satisfied:
1. Completeness. For all x ∈ L, Pr[V(x, s) = 1|(P ↔ V)[x] → s] = 1 −

1
nκ

for

1
.
nκ

In

each κ and the sufficient large input length n.
2. Soundness. For all x ∈
/ L and P 0 , Pr[V(x, s) = 1|(P 0 ↔ V)[x] → s] ≤

other words, if P 0 can convince V that x ∈
/ L is correct with the advantage ,
there exists a knowledge extractor, given rewindable black-box access
can output the witness of the statement x with the advantage  −

1

to P 0 ,

1
.
nκ

3. Zero-Knowledge. For all x ∈ L and V, there exists an simulator S such that
the two outputs SV (x) and V(x) are indistinguishable, where SV (x) denotes
the distribution generated by the simulator S on input x and V(x) denotes the
distribution generated by the verifier V who interacts with the prover P on
inputs x.
All languages in N P have zero-knowledge proofs if there exist one-way functions
[26].
1

In a rewindable black-box access, the extractor can send any values which its selects to the prover
and obtain the corresponding outputs of the prover, without knowing how the prover computes the
outputs. It allows the extractor to literally rewind a run of the prover to a previous state.
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Groth-Sahai Non-interactive Proof Systems for Bilinear Groups

Groth and Sahai [29] introduced efficient non-interactive witness-indistinguishable
proofs and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Their goal is to spread the use of
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs from mainly theoretical purposes to the large
class of practical cryptographic protocols based on bilinear groups. In this thesis,
we employ the Groth-Sahai proof technique to our provably secure RIC protocol,
which captures IND-privacy. In this section, we revisit the main component of their
scheme, which is directly related to this thesis.
Let (R, +, ·, 0, 1) be a finite commutative ring. An R-module A is an abelian
group (A, +, 0) where the ring acts on the group such that ∀r, s ∈ R, ∀x, y ∈ A:
(r + s)x = rx + sx ∧ r(x + y) = rx + ry ∧ r(sx) = (rs)x ∧ 1x = x.
A cyclic group G of order n can naturally be viewed as a Zn -module. Let A1 , A2 , AT
be finite R-modules with a bilinear map: f : A1 × A2 → AT . Consider quadratic
equations over variables x1 , ..., xm ∈ A1 , y1 , ..., yn ∈ A2 of the form
n
X
j=1

f (aj , yj ) +

m
X

f (xi , bi ) +

i=1

m X
n
X

γij f (xi , yj ) = t.

(2.1)

i=1 j=1

In order to simplify notation, let us define
~x · ~y =

n
X

f (xi , yi ).

(2.2)

j=1

Then equation (2.1) can be written as
~a · ~y + ~x · ~b + ~x · Γ~y = t.

(2.3)

For pairing product equations, define R = Zn , A1 = G1 , A2 = G2 , AT = GT ,
f (x, y) = e(x, y), and Equation (2.1) can be written as
~ · Y)(
~ X~ · B)(
~ X~ · ΓY)
~ = tT .
(A

(2.4)

Commitment from Modules
In the Groth-Sahai proofs, we will commit to the variables x1 , ..., xm ∈ A1 , y1 , ..., yn ∈
A2 . It is done by mapping them into other R-modules B1 , B2 and making the
commitments in those modules.
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To commit to elements from one R-modules A, the public key for the commitment scheme will describe another R-module B and R-linear maps ι : A → B and
p : B → A. Operations in the modules and computation of the map ι will be
efficiently computable, but p is had to compute. The public key will also contain
elements u1 , ..., um̂ ∈ B. To commit to x ∈ A, pick r1 , ..., rm̂ ← R at random and
compute the commitment
c := ι(x) +

m̂
X

ri ui .

(2.5)

i=1

The commitment scheme will have two types of commitment keys.
• Binding key: It defines (B, ι, p, u1 , ..., um̂ ) where ∀i : p(ui ) = 0 and p ◦ ι is nontrivial. The commitment (2.5) therefore contains the nontrivial information
p(c) = p(ι(c)) about x.
• Hiding key: It defines (B, ι, p, u1 , ..., um̂ ) where ι(A) ⊆ hu1 , ..., um̂ i. The commitment (2.5) therefore perfectly hides the element x when r1 , ..., rm̂ are chosen
at random from R.
For multiple elements x1 , ..., xm ∈ A, we write ~c := ι(~x) + R~u with R ∈
P
Matm×m̂ (R) for making commitments c1 , ..., cm where ci := ι(xi ) + m̂
j=1 rij uj .

Figure 2.1: Modules and maps [29]
The Groth-Sahai proof system is in the common reference string (CRS) model.
Part of the CRS specifies B1 , ι1 , p1 , u1 , ..., um̂ and B2 , ι2 , p2 , v1 , ..., vn̂ , which are commitment keys for A1 and A2 . Another part of the CRS specifies a third R-module
BT together with R-linear maps ιT : AT → BT and pT : BT → AT and a bilinear
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map F : B1 ×B2 → BT . It is required that the maps are commutative as described in
Figure 2.1 and with the exception of p1 , p2 , and pT , they are efficiently computable.
Instantiation Based on the SXDH Assumption
Setup. The setup algorithm GSXDH returns a prime order bilinear group gk =
(p, G1 , G2 , GT , e, P1 , P2 ).
Commitment. Consider a group G of prime order p. We will use the a commitment
key of the form
u1 = (P, Q) := (P, αP),

u2 = (U, V),

where α ← Z∗p is chose at random. We can choose u2 in two different ways: u2 := tu1
or u2 := tu1 − (O, P) for a random t ∈ Z∗p . The former choice of u2 gives a
perfectly binding commitment key, whereas the latter choice of u2 gives a perfectly
hiding commitment key. These two types of commitment keys are computationally
indistinguishable under the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption in G.
In order to commit a value X ∈ G1 using random r1 , r2 ∈ Zp :
ι(Z) := (O, Z),

p(Z1 , Z2 ) := Z2 − αZ1 ,

c := ι(X ) + r1 u1 + r2 u2 .

We can see that on a binding key where u2 = tu1 , we have that p ◦ ι is the identity
map on G and p(u1 ) = p(u2 ) = O. The commitment c = ((r1 +r2 t)P, (r1 +r2 t)Q+X )
corresponds to an ElGamal encryption of X .
Commitment to a scalar x ∈ Zp using randomness r ∈ Zp works as follows.
u := u2 + (O, P),

ι0 (z) := zu,

p0 (z1 P, z2 P); = z2 − αz1 ,

c := ι0 (x) + ru1 .

On a binding key p0 ◦ ι0 is the identity map and p0 (u1 ) = 0, so the commitment
scheme is perfectly binding and the commitment c = ((r + xt)P, (r + xt)Q + xP) is
an ElGamal encryption of xP.
The CRS contains the commitment keys (u1 , u2 , v1 , v2 ), where (u1 , u2 ) is a commitment key for group G1 implicitly defining maps ι1 , p1 , ι01 , p01 as described above
and (v1 , v2 ) is a commitment key for G2 implicitly defining maps ι2 , p2 , ι02 , p02 as
described above.
Let B1 = G21 , B2 = G22 and BT := G4T . The map F is defined as follows.
!
!!
!
X
Y
e(X
,
Y
)
e(X
,
Y
)
1
1
1
1
1
2
F : G21 × G22 → G4T ,
,
→
X2
Y2
e(X2 , Y1 ) e(X2 , Y2 )
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For pairing product equations, the CRS will describe R = Zp , A1 = G1 , A2 =
G2 , AT = GT ; B1 = G21 , B2 = G22 , BT = G4T and the following linear and bilinear
maps.

Figure 2.2: Maps for pairing product equations. [29]
For the multiscalar multiplication in G1 or G2 , and quadratic equations in Zp ,
readers may refer to [29] for the details.

Chapter 3
Related Work
In this chapter, we revisit some related work and provide a comprehensive review
on recent work related to Remote Integrity Check (RIC), Proof of Data Procession
(PDP),Proof of Retrievability (POR) and Proof of Ownership (POW). Although the
focus of this thesis is on RIC, it is important to also highlight PDP, POR and POW,
as they are closely related to RIC. In fact, some well-known schemes are based on
the techniques developed in PDP, POR and POW.

3.1

Provable Data Procession (PDP)

Ateniese et al. [3] introduced a model of PDP that can be used for RIC; namely a
client that has stored data at an untrusted server can verify that the server possesses
the original data without retrieving it. They presented two provably-secure PDP
schemes that are more efficient than previous schemes. The overhead at the server
is low, as opposed to linear in the size of the data. They also proposed a generic
transformation that adds robustness to any remote data checking scheme.
Ateniese et al.’s scheme improves the response length of the simple MAC-based
scheme using homomorphic authenticators or homomorphic verifiable tags. Tags
computed for multiple file blocks can be combined into a single value. The client
precomputes tags for each block of a file and then stores the file and its tags in
a server. The client can verify that the server possesses the file by generating a
random challenge for a randomly selected set of file blocks. The server retrieves the
queried blocks and their corresponding tags, and uses them to generate a proof of
possession. The client is thus convinced of data possession, without actually having
to retrieve file blocks.
In their scheme, Ateniese et al. introduced Homomorphic Verifiable Tags, which
lead to the notion of homomorphic authenticators. The authenticator σi on a file
23
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block mi is constructed in such a way that a verifier can be convinced that a linear
P
combination of blocks i νi mi (with arbitrary weights {νi }) was correctly generated
using an authenticator computed from {σi }. Therefore, their scheme offers two
elegant features: Blockless Verification, which means that using the homomorphic
verifiable tags the server can construct a proof that allow the client to verify if
the server possesses certain file blocks, even if the client does not have access to
the actual file blocks; and Homomorphic Tags, which means that given two tags,
anyone can combine them into a tag corresponding to the sum of the messages.
These features make their scheme unique. Homomorphic authenticators have also
been adopted in RIC and POR, which will be described later.
Ateniese et al. also proposed a strong adversary model, which states that although the data server must answer challenges from the client, it is not trusted to
store the file and may try to convince the client it possesses the file, even if the file is
totally or partially corrupted. Their motivation stems from the potential issue that
the data server might be financially motivated to sell the same storage resource to
multiple clients.

Figure 3.1: Protocol for provable data possession [3].
The PDP protocol of Ateniese et al. is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The client C is
the data owner of the file F , which consists of f blocks. C generates a small piece of
metadata stored locally and sends the file F to the server S. The local copy might
be deleted by the client. Therefore, their protocol achieves client side deduplication.
The server stores the file and responds to challenges sent by the client.
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Proof of Retrievability

The notion of Proof of Retrievability (POR) is proposed by Juels and Kaliski [31].
The concept of POR is based on that of Proof of Knowledge (POK) [7], that is, if
the prover can successfully pass the data integrity check, the verifier can retrieve
the unmodified data file from the prover. Juels and Kaliski’s POR scheme uses
spot-checking and error-correcting codes to ensure both “possession” and “retrievability” of data files on remote data storage systems. However, one limitation of
their approach is that the integrity checking must be done by the data owner. In
other words, it is not publicly verifiable.
Juels and Kaliski’s POR scheme addresses retrievability of encrypted files. They
introduced a new method to allow randomly embedding a set of checking blocks
called sentinels in the ciphertext of F . The encryption adopted in their protocol
enables the sentinels to be indistinguishable from the other file blocks. During a run
of POR, the verifier challenges the prover by specifying the position of a collection
of sentinels and asking the prover to return the associated sentinel values. If the
prover has deleted a substantial portion of F , then the verifier will be able to detect
the change with high probability. In order to protect against small corruption by
the prover, they also used error-correcting codes in their POR scheme.
Although Juels and Kaliski also described a straightforward Merkle-tree construction for public POR, this approach only works with encrypted data. Later,
several improved frameworks for POR protocols were proposed by Bowers et al.
[12], and Dodis et al. [20]. However, these works mainly focus on private audibility
(i.e. the integrity checking is done by the data owner).
Shacham and Waters [42] later provided two new POR schemes which are efficient
and provably secure. With a complete different idea from the Juels and Kaliski POR,
they presented two compact POR schemes, one for private auditing and the other
for public auditing. Both schemes are very efficient and proven secure. Their first
scheme is based on the BLS signature scheme [11] and can be applied to public
verification, but the full security was proved in the random oracle model. Their
second scheme is constructed based on a pseudo-random function allows only private
auditing, but its security is proved in the standard model. Shacham and Waters’
public auditing scheme serves as the basis of several Third Party Auditing RIC in
[44] and other related work.
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Shacham and Waters’ first scheme is not publicly verifiable. They require breaking an erasure encoded file into n blocks m1 , ..., mn ∈ Zp for some large p. The
user authenticates each block as follows. He selects a random α ∈ Zp and PRF
key k for function f . These values serve as his secret key. He then calculates an
authentication value for each block i as
σi = fk (i) + αmi ∈ Zp .
{mi } and the authenticator {σi } are stored on the server. To prove retrievability,
the verifier chooses a random challenge set I of l indices along with l random νi and
sends them to the prover. The prover then calculates the response, a pair (σ, µ), as
σ←

X

νi σ i

µ←

and

(i,νi )∈Q

X

νi mi .

(i,νi )∈Q

The verifier can check that the response was correctly formed by checking that
?

σ = αµ +

X

νi fk (i).

(i,νi )∈Q

Their second scheme is constructed based on BLS signature. The structure of
the BLS signatures permits them to be aggregated into linear combinations. The
security proof on this scheme is base on Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
The public auditing scheme of Shacham and Waters is presented below.
Assume that a user’s private key is x ∈ Zp and his public key is v = g x ∈ G along
with another generator u ∈ G. The signature on block i is σi = [H(i)umi ]x . On
Q
receiving query Q = {(i, νi )}, the prover computes and sends back σ ← (i,νi )∈Q σiνi
Q
and µ ← (i,νi )∈Q νi mi . The verification equation is

?

e(σ, g) = e 


Y

H(i)νi uµ , v  .

(i,νi )∈Q

3.3

Third Party Auditing

The concept of public auditing in remote data integrity checking is first proposed by
Ateniese et al. [4]. They introduced the notion of public auditability in their “provable data possession” (PDP) model for ensuring possession of data files on untrusted
storages. Ateniese et al. utilized the RSA-based homomorphic linear authenticators
for auditing outsourced data and suggested the approach of randomly sampling.
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However, as pointed out in [44], Ateniese et al.’s public auditing scheme exposes the
linear combination of sampled blocks to external auditor. When used directly, the
protocol is not privacy preserving, and thus may leak user data information to the
external auditor.
Shah et al. [43] has proposed to use a Third Party Auditor (TPA) to keep
online storage honest by first encrypting the data, and then sending a number of
pre-computed symmetric-keyed hashes over the encrypted data to the auditor. The
auditor then verifies the integrity of the data file and the server’s possession of a
previously committed decryption key. However, Shah et al.’s scheme only works for
encrypted files, and requires the auditor to maintain state. The scheme also suffers
from bounded usage since the keyed hashes may be used up.
Dynamic data storage has also been considered in some recent literatures of
RIC schemes. In [47], Wang et al. proposed to combine BLS-based Homomorphic
Linear Authenticator with Merkle Hash Tree to support fully data dynamics. In
an independent work, Erway et al. [22] also developed a skip list based scheme to
enable provable data possession with full dynamics support. However, similar to
Ateniese et al.’s public auditing scheme [4], neither of these two schemes is privacy
preserving, since the verification in both protocols requires the linear combination
of sampled data blocks as an input.

3.4

Privacy-preserving Third Party Auditing

The first privacy-preserving third party auditing scheme was proposed by Wang et
al. in [44]. In their paper, privacy-preserving means that the TPA should not be able
to recover the data file from the RIC protocol messages (i.e. integrity proofs) sent
by the cloud server. Wang et al.’s privacy preserving RIC scheme is still based on
BLS-based Homomorphic Linear Authenticator. However, they additional employed
a Schnorr Signature scheme [41] to “blind” the linear combination of sampled data
blocks. Another attractive feature of Wang et al.’s privacy preserving RIC scheme
is that it can support batch auditing, which allows the TPA to efficiently perform
multiple auditing tasks, perhaps from different users, in a batch manner.
The protocol involves three entities: the cloud server, the cloud user, and the
third party auditor (TPA). The cloud user relies on the cloud server to store and
maintain his/her data. Since the user no longer keeps the data locally, it is of critical
importance for the user to ensure that the data are correctly stored and maintained
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by the cloud server. In order to avoid periodically data integrity verification, the
user will resort to a TPA for checking the integrity of his/her outsourced data.
Nevertheless, as we will show later, Wang et al.’s scheme is not secure against
their own security model and does not provide the IND-Privacy. One major contribution of this research is to find an efficient way to improve Wang et al’s scheme so
that IND-Privacy can also be achieved.

3.5

Proof of Data Ownership

Proof of data ownership (POW) is a mechanism that allows users to prove their
ownership of the files. If the files are stored in a cloud, the proof can be carried
out remotely. The obvious difference between POW and RIC is that in a POW, the
prover could be any one who owns or stores the file or who has the knowledge of
the entire file. Roughly speaking, when we consider a POW in an RIC scenario, a
POW could be similar to an RIC proof if the prover is a data server.
A technique applied at cloud storage is sever side deduplicaion. The cloud server
only stores one single copy of each file regardless how many users asked to store this
file, which could save bandwidth and hardware cost. When users trying to access
their files, they prove their identification. In a typical cloud storage system with
deduplicaiton technique, users prove their ownership by hash values or some relating
information. However, this kind of information tend to be obtained easily or could
be obtained by other users.
In [30], some elegant solutions to POW were presented. Their solution is similar
to a POR. It works by encoding files using erasure code and building a Merkletree over the encoded file. In this solution, they used the collision-resistant hash
function H and the α-erasure-code E. On an input file F , the verifier generates the
encoding X = E(F ) and the Merkle tree M TH,b , then possess the only the root of
the tree as verification information. At auditing phase, user receives the challenge
with leaf indexes as random selected number, then proofs with sibling-paths of all
the leaves. Finally, Verifier outputs its argument. Another solution in this paper is
more efficient at a cost of weaker form of security. It hashes the potentially large file
using universal hash function into a reduction buffer of size at most 64 MBytes, then
the Merkle-tree protocol implements on this hashed values. The difference from the
solution before is using a hash function with public randomness instead of encoding
files using an erasure code.

Chapter 4
Analysis of Wang et al.’s Scheme
Data security and privacy is an important but challenging problem in cloud computing. One of the security concerns from cloud users is how to efficiently verify
the integrity of their data stored on the cloud server. Third Party Auditing (TPA)
is a new technique proposed in recent years to achieve this goal. In a recent paper
[44], Wang et al. proposed a highly efficient and scalable TPA protocol and also
a Zero Knowledge Public Auditing protocol which can prevent offline guessing attacks. However, in this chapter, we point out several security weaknesses in Wang
et al.’s protocols: first, we show that an attacker can arbitrarily modify the cloud
data without being detected by the auditor in the integrity checking process, and
the attacker can achieve this goal even without knowing the content of the cloud
data or any verification metadata maintained by the cloud server; secondly, we show
that the Zero Knowledge Public Auditing protocol cannot achieve its design goal,
that is to prevent offline guessing attacks.

4.1

Introduction

In INFOCOM’10, Wang et al. [46] proposed a privacy-preserving public auditing
protocol with high efficiency and scalability. In particular, the proposed protocol
supports batch auditing, which means the third party auditor can concurrently
handle simultaneous auditing of multiple tasks. In [44], Wang et al. further extended
their TPA protocol and proposed a new Zero Knowledge Public Auditing (ZKPA)
protocol. The main security goal of the ZKPA protocol is to prevent offline guessing
attack (or offline dictionary attack). It is worth noting that the early version of Wang
et al.’s TPA protocol published in INFOCOM’10 is insecure: Xu et al. showed [16]
that the cloud server can modify the user data without being caught by the auditor
in the auditing process. However, Xu et al.’s attack cannot be applied to the TPA
29
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and ZKPA protocols in [44].
In this chapter, we show that there are several security weaknesses in Wang et
al.’s TPA and ZKPA protocols [44]. First, we show that an attacker can arbitrarily
modify the cloud data without being detected by the auditor in the integrity checking
process of both protocols. We show that such an attack can be performed by different
types of attackers under different scenarios, and in the weakest attacking setting,
the attack can be lunched even when the attacker doesn’t know the content of the
cloud data or any verification metadata which are maintained by the cloud server
and required in the auditing process (the only information the attacker needs to
know is how data are modified). In reality, such an attack can be lunched by either
external or internal attacks (e.g. a malicious programmer who doesn’t have access
to cloud user data can perform such an attack by embedding some software bugs in
a computer program on the cloud server). We remark that it is possible to prevent
such attacks by using some extra security mechanisms (e.g. access control) on the
cloud server, but this is orthogonal to the security goals of an integrity checking
scheme. The key point is that, if an integrity checking protocol is secure and robust,
then once the user data stored on the cloud server have been modified, the auditor
must be able to detect it in the integrity checking process. Secondly, we show that
the ZKPA protocol cannot achieve its original security goal, that is, we can still
launch an offline guessing attack against the protocol.
In the next section, we review Wang et al.’s threat model and their TPA and
ZKPA protocols. Then we show the security weaknesses in these two protocols in
Sec. 4.3. The Chapter is concluded in Sec. 4.4.

4.2

Review of Wang et al.’s Threat Model and
Protocols

4.2.1

The Threat Model

We briefly review the threat model presented in [44]. The cloud data storage service
involves three entities: the cloud server, the cloud user, and the third party auditor
(TPA). The cloud user relies on the cloud server to store and maintain his/her huge
amount of data. Since the user no longer keeps the data locally, it is of critical
importance for the user to ensure that the data are correctly stored and maintained
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by the cloud server. In order avoid periodically data integrity verification, the user
may resort to a TPA for checking the integrity of his/her outsourced data. However,
the data must be kept secret from the TPA during the integrity checking process.
In [44], it is assumed that data integrity threats can come from both internal
and external attacks to the cloud server, such as malicious software bugs, hackers,
network bugs, etc. Besides, the cloud server may also try to hide data corruption
incidents to users for the sake of reputation. However, it is assumed that the TPA
is reliable and independent, and would not collude with the cloud server.
Five security goals are listed in [44]: public auditability, storage correctness,
privacy preserving, batch auditing, and lightweight. Among these goals, storage
correctness and privacy preserving (i.e. the auditor cannot learn the content of the
user data in the auditing process) are the most important security goals that must be
achieved by a privacy-preserving third party auditing protocol. For Zero Knowledge
Public Auditing, there is an extra security goal, that is the protocol must be secure
against offline guessing attacks.

4.2.2

The Third Party Auditing Protocol

Let (p, G1 , G2 , GT , e, g) denote the system parameters of a bilinear group. Wang et
al.’s privacy-preserving public auditing scheme works as follows:
Setup Phase:
KeyGen: The cloud user runs KeyGen to generate the public and secret keys. Specifically, the user generates a random verification and signing key pair (spk, ssk) of
a digital signature scheme, a random x ← ZZp , a random element u ← G1 , and
computes v ← g x . The user secret key is sk = (x, ssk) and the user public key is
pk = (spk, v, g, u, e(u, v)).
SigGen: Given a data file F = (m1 , ..., mn ), the user first chooses uniformly at
random from ZZp a unique identifier name for F . The user then computes authenticator σi for each data block mi as σi ← (H(Wi ) · umi )x ∈ G1 where Wi = nameki.
Denote the set of authenticators by φ = {σi }1≤i≤n .

Then the user computes

t = namekSSigssk (name) as the file tag for F , where SSigssk (name) is the user’s
signature on name under the signing key ssk. It was assumed that the TPA knows
the number of blocks n. The user then sends F along with the verification metadata
(φ, t) to the cloud server and deletes them from local storage.
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Audit Phase (Figure 4.1):
VerifySig: The TPA first retrieves the file tag t and verifies the signature SSigssk (name)
by using spk. The TPA quits by emitting FALSE if the verification fails. Otherwise,
the TPA recovers name.

TPA

Cloud Server

1. Retrieve file tag t and verify
its signature. Quit if fail.
2. Generate a random challenge
chal = {i, νi }i∈I

chal

−−−−−−−−−→

µ,σ,R

←−−−−−−−−−

Compute γ = h(R) and then
verify (µ, σ, R).

P
0
Compute
µ
=
i∈I νi mi and
Q
σ = i∈I σiνi ;
Randomly pick r ← ZZp and compute
R = e(u, v)r and γ = h(R);
Compute µ = r + γµ0 mod p

Figure 4.1: The third party auditing protocol by Wang et al. [44].
Challenge: The TPA generates a challenge chal for the cloud server as follows:
first pick a random c-element subset I = {s1 , ..., sc } of set [1, n], and then for each
element i ∈ I, choose a random value νi . The TPA sends chal = {(i, νi )}i∈I to the
cloud server.
GenProof: Upon receiving the challenge chal, the server generates a response to
prove the data storage correctness. Specifically, the server chooses a random element
r ← ZZp , and calculates R = e(u, v)r ∈ GT . Let µ0 denote the linear combination
P
of sampled blocks specified in chal: µ0 = i∈I vi mi . To blind µ0 with r, the server
computes µ = r + γµ0 mod p, where γ = h(R) ∈ ZZp . Meanwhile, the server also
Q
calculates an aggregated authenticator σ = i∈I σiνi . It then sends (µ, σ, R) as the
response to the TPA.
VerifyProof: Upon receiving the response (µ, σ, R) from the cloud server, the TPA
validates the response by first computing γ = h(R) and then checking the following
verification equation
γ

?

R · e(σ , g) = e((

sc
Y

i=s1

H(Wi )νi )γ · uµ , v).

(4.1)
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The verification is successful if the equation holds.

4.2.3

The Zero Knowledge Public Auditing Protocol

As pointed out by Wang et al. in [44], the TPA protocol presented above is vulnerable to offline guessing attack. In order to prevent the attack, Wang et al. proposed
the Zero Knowledge Public Auditing (ZKPA) protocol which is an extension of their
TPA protocol.
The Setup phase is almost the same as in the TPA protocol, except that an
additional generator g1 ∈ G1 is introduced in the user public key. In the Audit phase,
upon receiving the challenge chal = {(i, νi )}i∈I , the cloud server selects three random
blind elements rm , rσ , ρ ∈ ZZp , and calculates R = e(g1 , g)rσ e(u, v)rm ∈ GT and
γ = h(R) ∈ ZZp . The cloud server then calculates µ0 , σ according to the TPA protocol
(Fig. 5.3), blinds both µ0 and σ by computing µ = rm + γµ0 mod p, ς = rσ + γρ
mod p and Σ = σg1ρ . The cloud server then sends (ς, µ, Σ, R) as the response to the
TPA. To verify it, the TPA computes γ = h(R) and then checks
γ

?

R · e(Σ , g) = e((

sc
Y

H(Wi )νi )γ · uµ , v) · e(g1 , g)ς .

(4.2)

i=s1

4.3

Security Weaknesses in Wang et al.’s TPA
and ZKPA Protocols

4.3.1

Storage Correctness

It is originally believed that Wang et al. TPA protocol can achieve all the five
design goals given in Sec. 4.2.1. However, below we show that the protocol cannot
achieve the important goal of Storage Correctness: an attacker can arbitrarily modify
the data but at the same time fool the auditor to believe that the data are well
maintained by the cloud server. We describe the attack in two different scenarios:
in the first scenario, the attacker (e.g. a hacker or internal employee of the cloud
server) can learn the content of the user data file F and modify it; while in the second
the scenario, the attacker can modify the file F but does not know its content (e.g.
a malicious programmer plants a bug in the software running on the cloud server).
Scenario 1: In this scenario, we assume the attacker (e.g. an employee of the
cloud server) can access the user data file F . The attacker first makes a copy of the
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original file, and then modifies file blocks mi to mi ∗ = mi + βi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In the audit phase, after verifying the file tag t = namekSSigssk (name), the
TPA sends a challenge {(i, νi )}i∈I to the cloud server. Upon receiving the challenge,
the cloud server would honestly compute R = e(u, v)r for a randomly chosen r and
Q
σ = i∈I σiνi . However, as the data file has been modified, the cloud server would
calculate
µ

∗

0∗

= r + γµ = r + γ

sc
X

νi m∗i

i=s1

= r+γ
= µ+γ

sc
X
i=s1
sc
X

νi (mi + βi )
νi β i .

i=s1

When the cloud server sends the response (µ∗ , σ, R) to the TPA, the attacker
intercepts the message and generates a new response as follows:
1. compute γ = h(R), α = γ

sc
P

νi βi , R̂ = R · e(uα , v) and γ̂ = h(R̂);

i=s1

2. compute µ0 =

sc
P

νi mi and µ̂ = µ0 (γ̂ − γ) + µ∗ .

i=s1

The attacker then sends (µ̂, σ, R̂) to the TPA who will perform the verification
according to Equation (1). The verification will be successful as shown below.

γ̂

r

α

R̂ · e(σ , g) = e(u, v) e(u , v)e((

sc
Y

σiνi )γ̂ , g)

i=s1

= e(ur , v)e(uα , v)e((

sc
Y

(H(Wi )umi )xνi )γ̂ , g)

i=s1

= e(ur , v)e(uα , v)e(
= e(ur , v)e(uα , v)e(

sc
Y

(H(Wi )umi )νi γ̂ , g x )

i=s1
sc
Y

H(Wi )νi γ̂ umi νi γ̂ , v)

i=s1
sc
Y

= e(ur , v)e(uα , v)e((

i=s1

= e((

sc
Y

i=s1

0

0

H(Wi )νi )γ̂ uγ̂µ , v)

H(Wi )νi )γ̂ uγ̂µ +α+r , v)
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i=s1
sc
Y

= e((

0

∗ −γµ0

H(Wi )νi )γ̂ uγ̂µ +µ
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, v)

H(Wi )νi )γ̂ uµ̂ , v).

i=s1

Scenario 2: In the second scenario, we assume the attacker (e.g. a malicious
programmer who has planted a software bug on the cloud server) modifies the file
block mi to mi ∗ = mi + βi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. However, the attacker only knows βi (i.e.
how the user data are modified) but not mi or m∗i .
In the audit phase, the TPA and the cloud server honestly execute the auditing
protocol. That is, TPA sends a challenge {(i, νi )}i∈I to the cloud server, and the
cloud server sends back a response (µ∗ , R, σ) where R = e(u, v)r for a randomly
Q
chosen r, σ = i∈I σiνi , and
∗

0∗

µ = r + γµ = r + γ

sc
X

νi m∗i

=r+γ

i=s1

=µ+γ

sc
X

sc
X

νi (mi + βi )

i=s1

νi βi .

i=s1

The attacker intercepts the response (µ∗ , R, σ) from the cloud server to the TPA,
sc
sc
P
P
νi βi . It is easy to
νi βi = h(R)
and modifies µ∗ to µ = µ∗ − α where α = γ
i=s1

i=s1

see that by doing such a simple modification, the attacker derives a correct response
with respect to the original message blocks {mi }i∈I . In this way, the attacker can
successfully fool the auditor to believe that the data file F is well preserved, while
the real file on the cloud server has been modified.

4.3.2

Offline Guessing Attack

The TPA protocol presented in Fig. 5.3 is vulnerable to offline guessing attack [44],
?

since the TPA can always guess whether µ0 = µ̃0 , by checking
?

e(σ, g) = e((

sc
Y

0

H(Wi )νi ) · uµ̃ , v)

(4.3)

i=s1

where µ̃0 is constructed from random coefficients chosen by the TPA in the challenge
and the guessed message {m̃i }s1 ≤i≤sc .
In order to prevent the offline guessing attack, in the ZKPA protocol, two additional blind elements rσ and ρ are introduced. It was believed that the ZKPA
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protocol can effectively prevent the offline guessing attack. However, below we
show that the ZKPA protocol is still vulnerable to offline guessing attack. Given
chal = {(i, νi )}i∈I and the response (ς, µ, Σ, R), our attack works as follows:
1. for the guessed message {m̃i }s1 ≤i≤sc , compute µ̃0 = Σi∈I νi m̃i and r̃m = µ − γ µ̃0
mod p;
2. compute e(g1 , g)r̃σ = R/e(u, v)r̃m ;
3. compute e(g1 , g)ρ̃ = (e(g, g)ς /e(g1 , g)r̃σ )γ

−1

and e(σ̃, g) = e(Σ, g)/e(g1 , g)ρ̃ ;

4. check the equation
?

e(σ̃, g) = e((

sc
Y

0

H(Wi )νi ) · uµ̃ , v).

i=s1

If the equation holds, then output the guessed message {m̃i }s1 ≤i≤sc ; otherwise,
goto step 1 for another guess.
The above attack essentially shows that the attacker can successfully remove the
additional blind elements introduced in the ZKPA protocol and use equation (4.3)
to locate the message {mi }s1 ≤i≤sc .

4.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we revisited a privacy-preserving third party auditing (TPA) cloud
storage integrity checking protocol and its extended version for zero knowledge public
auditing (ZKPA). We showed several security weaknesses in these protocols. It is
still an open problem to design a ZKPA protocol that can prevent offline guessing
attacks, and we leave it as our future work.

Chapter 5
IND-Privacy in RIC
As we have seen in the previous chapters, with a rapid growth of data storages in
the cloud, the data integrity check in a remote data storage system has become an
important issue. A number of works have been done in the literature to address this
issue. However, data privacy issues for data storage systems in the cloud have not
being formally defined and investigated. We believe that these issues are equally
important that the communication flows of integrity checking proofs from the cloud
server should not reveal any useful information of the stored data. In this chapter, we
introduce a novel definition of data privacy for the cloud by an Indistinguishability
game. We found that the previous remote integrity checking schemes have not
captured this feature. We also found that by using witness indistinguishable proofs
to the communication flows from the cloud server, the data privacy is achievable.
We provide a comprehensive study on data privacy in RIC proofs and a concrete
scheme that guarantees both data integrity and privacy.

5.1

Introduction

Although data integrity check is a crucial and necessary step in cloud storage security, it is important that such a process should not introduce new vulnerabilities of unauthorized information leakage. The previous efforts in Remote Integrity
Checking (RIC) accommodate several security features including data integrity and
confidentiality, which mainly ensure secure maintenance of data. However, they do
not cover the issue of data privacy, which means that the communication flows (RIC
proofs) from the cloud server should not reveal any useful information to the adversary. Intuitively, by “privacy”, we mean that an adversary should not be able to
distinguish which file has been uploaded by the client to the cloud server. We refer
it as Indistinguishability (IND). We believe that it is very important to consider such
37
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privacy issues adequately in protocol designs. Taking some existing TPA based RIC
proofs [46, 44, 47] as an example, the proof sent by the cloud server to the auditor
does not allow the auditor to recover the file, but the auditor can still distinguish
which file (among a set of possible files) is involved in the RIC proof, which is clearly
undesirable.
In this chapter, we propose an indistinguishability-based definition of data privacy (IND-Privacy, for short) for TPA based RIC protocols. We show that two recently published RIC schemes [44, 47] are insecure under our new definition, which
means some information about the user file is leaked in the RIC proof. We then
provide an new construction to demonstrate how IND-privacy can be achieved. We
show that by applying the Witness Indistinguishability proof technique [29], we are
able to achieve IND-privacy in RIC protocols. To the best of our knowledge, our
construction is the first scheme that can achieve IND-privacy.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
security model and definition of data privacy for RIC proofs. In Section 3, we
analyse the RIC protocols by Wang et al. and show why their RIC protocols fail
to capture data privacy. In Section 4, we demonstrate how data privacy can be
achieved with a witness indistinguishability proof. We also provide the definition of
soundness for RIC proofs and show the soundness of our protocol based on witness
indistinguishability proof. We conclude the paper in Section 6.

5.2

Definitions and Security Model

We will focus on TPA based Remote Integrity Checking (RIC) protocols in this
chapter. The protocol involves three entities: the cloud server, the cloud user, and
the third party auditor (TPA). The cloud user relies on the cloud server to store and
maintain his/her data. Since the user no longer keeps the data locally, it is of critical
importance for the user to ensure that the data are correctly stored and maintained
by the cloud server. In order to avoid periodically data integrity verification, the
user will resort to a TPA for checking the integrity of his/her outsourced data. We
define a TPA protocol for cloud storage as a tuple of five algorithms:
• KeyGen: Taking as input a security parameter λ, the algorithm KeyGen generates the public and private key pair (pk, sk) of a cloud user (or data owner).
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• TokenGen: Taking as input a file F and the user private key sk, this algorithm
generates a file tag t (which includes a file name name) and an authenticator1
σ for F . The file and file tag, as well as the authenticator are then stored in
the cloud server.
• Challenge: Given the user public key pk and a file tag t, this algorithm is run
by the auditor to generate a random challenge chal for the cloud server.
• Respond: Taking as input (F, t, σ, chal), this algorithm outputs a proof P,
which is used to prove the integrity of the file.
• Verify: Taking as input (pk, t, chal, P), the algorithm outputs either True or
False.
RIC Privacy. We define the data privacy for RIC proofs via an indistinguishability
game between a simulator S (i.e. the cloud server or prover) and an adversary A
(i.e. the auditor or verifier).
Setup: The simulator runs KeyGen to generate (sk, pk) and passes pk to the adversary A.
Phase 1: A is allowed to make Token Generation queries. To make such a query,
A selects a file F and sends it to S. S generates a file tag t, an authenticator σ,
and then returns (t, σ) to A.
Phase 2: A chooses two different files F0 , F1 that has not appeared in Phase 1,
and sends them to S. S calculates (t0 , σ0 ) and (t1 , σ1 ) by running the TokenGen
algorithm. S then tosses a coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and sends tb back to A. A generates a
challenge chal and sends it to S. S generates a proof P based on (Fb , tb , σb ) and A’s
challenge chal and then sends P to A. Finally, A outputs a bit b0 as the guess of b.
The process is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Define the advantage of the adversary A as
AdvA (λ) = | Pr[b0 = b] − 1/2|.
Definition 5.1 We say an RIC proof has indistinguishability if for any polynomialtime algorithm A, AdvA (λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
1
In the RIC protocols presented in this paper, the file F is divided into multiple data blocks,
and the authenticator σ for F is in fact a set of authenticators for individual data blocks.
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S

Generate two different files:
(0)
(0)
F0 = (m1 , · · · , mn )
(1)

(1)

F0 , F1

F1 = (m1 , · · · , mn )

−−−→

Generate a challenge chal

←−b−−
chal
−−−→

t

Calculate:
(ti , σi ) = TokenGen(sk, Fi ) for i = 0, 1
Randomly select b ∈ {0, 1}
Send tb back to A
Calculate the proof P

Make a guess b

P

0

←−−−

Figure 5.1: Indistinguishability game run between A and S

5.3

Indistinguishability Analysis of Existing RIC
Protocols

In this section, we will show that several RIC protocols proposed in the literature
cannot satisfy our definition of IND-Privacy.

5.3.1

An RIC Protocol by Wang et al. [47]

In [47], Wang et al. presented an RIC protocol based on Merkle Hash Tree (MHT)
[37]. Their protocol works as follows.
Setup Phase: The cloud user generates the keys and authentication tokens for the
files as follows.
KeyGen: The cloud user runs KeyGen to generate the public and private key pair.
Specifically, the user generates a random verification and signing key pair (spk, ssk)
of a digital signature scheme, and set the public key pk = (v, spk) and sk = (x, ssk)
where x is randomly chosen from ZZp and v = g x .
TokenGen: Given a file F = (m1 , m2 , · · · , mn ), the client chooses a file name name,
a random element u ∈ G1 and calculates the file tag
t = nameknkukSSigssk (nameknku),
and authenticators σi = (H(mi ) · umi )x where H is a cryptographic hash function
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modeled as a random oracle. The client then generates a root R based on the
construction of Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) where the leave nodes of the tree are an
ordered set of hash values H(mi )(i = 1, 2, · · · , n). The client then signs the root R
under the private key x: sigsk (H(R)) = (H(R))x and sends {F, t, {σi }, sigsk (H(R))}
to the cloud server.
Audit Phase: The TPA first obtains the file tag t and verifies the signature
SSigssk (nameknku) by using spk. If the verification is successful, the TPA obtains
name and u.
Challenge: To generate chal, TPA picks a random subset I = {s1 , s2 , s3 , ..., sc } of set
[1, n], where s1 ≤ · · · ≤ sc . Then, the TPA sends a challenge chal = {i, νi }i∈I to the
cloud server where νi is randomly selected from ZZp .
Response: Upon receiving the challenge chal = {i, νi }i∈I , the cloud server computes
Q
P
µ = i∈I νi mi and σ = i∈I σiνi . The cloud server will also provide the verifier
with a small amount of auxiliary information {Ωi }i∈I , which are the node siblings
on the path from the leaves H(mi )i∈I to the root R of the MHT. The server sends
the proof P = {µ, σ, {H(mi ), Ωi }i∈I , sigsk (H(R))} to the TPA.
Verify: Upon receiving the responses from the cloud server, the TPA generates the
root R using {H(mi ), Ωi }i∈I , and authenticates it by checking
e(sigsk (H(R)), g) = e(H(R), v).
If the authentication fails, the verifier rejects by emitting FALSE. Otherwise, the
verifier checks
e(σ, g) = e((

sc
Y

H(mi )νi )uµ , v).

i=s1

If the equation holds, output True; otherwise, output False.
Indistinguishability Analysis
It is easy to see that the above RIC protocol does not provide IND-Privacy. Let A
denote an IND adversary which works as follows (also see Fig. 5.2).
(0)

(0)

(1)

(1)

• A chooses distinct files F0 = (m1 , · · · , mn ) and F1 = (m1 , · · · , mn ) where
(0)

(1)

mi 6= mi .
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(1)

• S generates (t0 , {σi }, sigsk (H(R(0) ))) and (t1 , {σi }, sigsk (H(R(1) ))) for F0
and F1 respectively. S then chooses a random b ∈ {0, 1} and sends tb back to
A.
• A chooses a random challenge chal = {i, νi }i∈I .
• S computes and sends to A the response
(b)

(b)

P = (µ(b) , σ (b) , {H(mi ), Ωi }i∈I , sigsk (H(R(b) ))).
(0)

• A chooses an index i ∈ I and calculates H(mi ) and compare it with the
(b)

received H(mi ). If they are equal, output 0; otherwise, output 1.
Probability Analysis. It is easy to see that A has an overwhelming probability
to guess the value of b correctly since the probability that
(0)

(1)

(0)

(1)

mi 6= mi ∧ H(mi ) = H(mi )
is negligible since the hash function is assumed to be a random oracle in [47].

5.3.2

Another Privacy Preserving RIC Protocol by Wang
et al. [44]

In [44], Wang et al. introduced a new RIC protocol. Compared with the RIC
protocol presented above, this new protocol aims to achieve the additional property
of privacy preserving (i.e. the TPA cannot learn the content of the file in the auditing
process).
Let (p, G1 , G2 , GT , e, g1 , g, H, h) be the system parameters as introduced above.
Wang et al.’s privacy-preserving public auditing scheme works as follows (also see
Fig. 5.3):
Setup Phase:
KeyGen: The cloud user runs KeyGen to generate the public and private key pair.
Specifically, the user generates a random verification and signing key pair (spk, ssk)
of a digital signature scheme, a random x ← ZZp , a random element u ← G1 , and
computes v ← g x . The user secret key is sk = (x, ssk) and the user public key is
pk = (spk, v, u).
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S

Generate two distinct files:
(0)
(0)
F0 = (m1 , · · · , mn )
(1)

(1)

F1 = (m1 , · · · , mn )

F0 , F1

−−−→

(0)

Compute (t0 , {σi }, sigsk (H(R(0) )))
(1)
and (t1 , {σi }, sigsk (H(R(1) )))
Randomly select b ∈ {0, 1}

t

chal = {i, νi }i∈I

←−b−−
chal
−−−→

P
(b)
Compute µ(b) = i∈I νi mi and
Q
(b)
σ (b) = i∈I (σi )νi
Prepare {Ωi }i∈I
Set the proof
(b)
(b)
P = µ(b) , σ (b) , {H(mi ), Ωi }i∈I ,
sigsk (H(R(b) ))

P

←−−−
Choose i ∈ I
(0)
Calculate H(mi )
(b)
(0)
If H(mi ) = H(mi )
return 0
Otherwise, return 1

Figure 5.2: Indistinguishability analysis on Wang et al.’s RIC Protocol [47].
TokenGen: Given a data file F = (m1 , ..., mn ), the user first chooses uniformly at
random from ZZp a unique identifier name for F . The user then computes authenticator σi for each data block mi as σi ← (H(Wi ) · umi )x ∈ G1 where Wi = nameki.
Denote the set of authenticators by φ = {σi }1≤i≤n .

Then the user computes

t = namekSSigssk (name) as the file tag for F , where SSigssk (name) is the user’s
signature on name under the signing key ssk. It was assumed that the TPA knows
the number of blocks n. The user then sends F along with the verification metadata
(φ, t) to the cloud server and deletes them from local storage.
Audit Phase: The TPA first obtains the file tag t and verifies the signature
SSigssk (name) by using spk. The TPA quits by emitting ⊥ if the verification fails.
Otherwise, the TPA recovers name.
Challenge: The TPA generates a challenge chal for the cloud server as follows: first
picks a random c-element subset I = {s1 , ..., sc } of set [1, n], and then for each
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Cloud Server

1. Retrieve the file tag t and verify
its signature. Quit if fail.
2. Generate a random challenge
chal = {i, νi }i∈I

6. Compute γ = h(R) and then
verify (µ, σ, R).

−−−→

chal

P
0
3. Compute
Q µνi= i∈I νi mi and
σ = i∈I σi ;
4. Randomly pick r ← ZZp and
compute
R = e(u, v)r and γ = h(R);

µ,σ,R

5. Compute µ = r + γµ0 mod p

←−−−

Figure 5.3: The third party auditing protocol by Wang et al. [44].
element i ∈ I, chooses a random value νi ∈ ZZp . The TPA sends chal = {(i, νi )}i∈I
to the cloud server.
Response: Upon receiving the challenge chal, the server generates a response to
prove the data storage correctness. Specifically, the server chooses a random element
r ← ZZp , and calculates R = e(u, v)r ∈ GT . Let µ0 denote the linear combination
P
of sampled blocks specified in chal: µ0 = i∈I νi mi . To blind µ0 with r, the server
computes µ = r + γµ0 mod p, where γ = h(R) ∈ ZZp . Meanwhile, the server also
Q
calculates an aggregated authenticator σ = i∈I σiνi . It then sends (µ, σ, R) as the
response to the TPA.
Verify: Upon receiving the response (µ, σ, R) from the cloud server, the TPA validates the response by first computing γ = h(R) and then checking the following
verification equation
γ

?

R · e(σ , g) = e((

sc
Y

H(Wi )νi )γ · uµ , v).

(5.1)

i=s1

The verification is successful if the equation holds.
Indistinguishability Analysis
In [44], it has been shown that the RIC proof is privacy preserving. That is, the
TPA cannot recover the file F from the proof. This is done by concealing the value
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B

Generate two distinct files:
(0)
(0)
F0 = (m1 , · · · , mn )
(1)

F0 , F1

(1)

F1 = (m1 , · · · , mn )

(0)

−−−−→ Compute (t0 , {σi }) for F0
(1)
and (t1 , {σi }) for F1
Randomly choose b ∈ {0, 1}
tb
←−−−−
P
chal
(b)
−−−−→ Compute µ0 = i∈I (νi mi ) and
Q
(b)
σ (b) = i∈I (σi )νi ;
Randomly pick r ← ZZp and
compute
R = e(u, v)r and γ = h(R);

chal = {i, νi }i∈I

P
µ, σ (b) , R
(0)
←−−−− Compute µ = r + γµ0 mod p
Compute µ00 = i∈I (νi mi ).
Check
Q if
0
e(( i∈I H(Wi )νi )uµ0 , v) = e(σ (b) , g).
If true, output 0; otherwise, output 1.

Figure 5.4: Indistinguishability analysis on Wang et al. RIC Protocol [44].
of µ0 . However, we found that such a treatment could not guarantee that there is no
information leakage during the auditing process. Below we show that Wang et al.’s
scheme cannot achieve indistinguishability. Let A denote an IND adversary which
works as follows (also see Fig. 5.4).
(0)

(0)

(1)

(1)

• A chooses two distinct files F0 = (m1 , · · · , mn ) and F1 = (m1 , · · · , mn )
(0)

(1)

such that mi 6= mi

for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.

(0)

(1)

• S generates (t0 , {σi }) and (t1 , {σi }) for F0 and F1 respectively. S then
chooses a random b ∈ {0, 1} and sends tb back to A.
• After receiving the tag tb , A chooses a random challenge chal = {i, νi }i∈I .
• S computes and sends to A the response P = (µ, σ (b) , R).
• A computes µ00 =

(0)
i∈I (νi mi )

P

and checks if

Y
0
e( (H(Wi ))νi uµ0 , v) = e(σ (b) , g).
i∈I

If it is true, return 0; otherwise, return 1.
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Probability Analysis. If b = 0, then σ (b) = σ (0) and the equation
e(

Y
0
(H(Wi ))νi uµ0 , v) = e(σ (0) , g)
i∈I

always holds. On the other hand, if b = 1, then σ (b) = σ (1) and
e(

Y
0
(H(Wi ))νi uµ0 , v) = e(σ (1) , g)
i∈I

holds only when
µ00 (=

X

(0)

(νi mi )) = µ01 (=

i∈I

X

(1)

(νi mi )),

i∈I
(0)

which happens only with probability 1/p for randomly selected {νi }i∈I since mi 6=
(1)

mi

for all i ∈ I. Therefore, A has an overwhelming probability to guess the value

of b correctly.
Indistinguishability of the Zero-Knowledge RIC Protocol in [44].
In [44], Wang et al. also extended their privacy-preserving RIC protocol presented
above to a Zero-Knowledge (ZK) RIC Protocol.
The Setup phase is almost the same as in the original RIC protocol, except that
an additional generator g1 ∈ G1 is introduced in the user public key. In the Audit
phase, upon receiving the challenge chal = {(i, νi )}i∈I , the cloud server selects three
random blind elements rm , rσ , ρ ∈ ZZp , and calculates R = e(g1 , g)rσ e(u, v)rm ∈ GT
and γ = h(R) ∈ ZZp . The cloud server then computes µ0 , σ according to the original
RIC protocol, blinds both µ0 and σ by computing µ = rm + γµ0 mod p, ς = rσ + γρ
mod p, and Σ = σg1ρ . The cloud server then sends (ς, µ, Σ, R) as the response to the
auditor. To verify it, the auditor computes γ = h(R) and then checks
?

γ

R · e(Σ , g) = e((

sc
Y

H(Wi )νi )γ · uµ , v) · e(g1 , g)ς .

(5.2)

i=s1

However, the above Zero-Knowledge RIC protocol does not achieve IND-Privacy
either. Consider the following attack performed by an IND adversary A.
(0)

(0)

(1)

(1)

1. A chooses two distinct files F0 = (m1 , · · · , mn ) and F1 = (m1 , · · · , mn )
(0)

(1)

such that mi 6= mi

(0)

for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(1)

2. S generates (t0 , {σi }) and (t1 , {σi }) for F0 and F1 respectively. S then
chooses a random b ∈ {0, 1} and sends tb back to A.
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3. After receiving the tag tb , A chooses a random challenge chal = {i, νi }i∈I .
4. S computes and sends to A the response P = (ς, µ, Σ, R).
(0)

P

νi mi and r̃m = µ−γµ00 mod p where γ = h(R). Then

A computes e(g1 , g)

= R/e(u, v)r̃m , e(g1 , g)ρ̃ = (e(g1 , g)ς /e(g1 , g)r̃σ )γ , and

5. A computes µ00 =

i∈I
r̃σ

−1

e(σ̃, g) = e(Σ, g)/e(g1 , g)ρ̃ ;
6. A then checks the equation
?

e(σ̃, g) = e((

sc
Y

0

H(Wi )νi ) · uµ0 , v).

(5.3)

i=s1

If the equation holds, A outputs 0, otherwise, outputs 1.
If b = 0, then e(σ̃, g) = e(σ (0) , g), and hence Equation 5.3 always holds. On the
P
(0)
other hand, if b = 1, then Equation 5.3 holds only when µ00 (= i∈I (νi mi )) = µ01 (=
P
(1)
i∈I (νi mi )), which happens only with probability 1/p.

5.4

A New RIC Protocol with IND-Privacy

In order to achieve the IND-privacy, we adopt the Witness Indistinguishable Proof
of Knowledge technique proposed by Groth and Sahai [29]. Their method can be
applied to pairing groups. Our goal is to protect both the file and the corresponding
authenticator so that the adversary cannot learn any information about the file.
Similar to Wang et al.’s scheme [44] reviewed in Section 5.3.2, our scheme is still
based on the “aggregate authenticator” introduced by Shacham and Waters [42].
That is, the cloud server will prove that the equation
e(σ, g) = e((

Sc
Y

0

H(Wi )νi )uµ , v)

(5.4)

i=S1

holds, where µ0 =

P

i∈I

νi mi and σ =

Q

0

i∈I

σiνi . We will treat (uµ , σ) as the witness

when applying the Groth-Sahai proof system, and rewrite Equation 5.4 as follows
0

e(σ, g)e(uµ , v −1 ) = e((

Sc
Y

H(Wi )νi ), v).

(5.5)

i=S1
0

In order to protect the privacy of µ0 (or uµ ) and σ, the user computes an additional commitment key ~u = (u1 , u2 ) of the form
u1 = (u, uα ), u2 = (uτ , uτ α ),
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where α, τ are selected from ZZp at random and u is the same generator of G1 used
in Wang et al.’s scheme. This additional commitment key ~u is now part of the
0

user public key. To hide uµ and σ, the Cloud Server computes the commitments
~c = (c1 , c2 ) as
c1 = (c11 , c12 ) = (ur11 +r12 τ , uα(r11 +r12 τ ) σ),
0

c2 = (c21 , c22 ) = (ur21 +r22 τ , uα(r21 +r22 τ ) uµ ).
where ri,j (i, j ∈ {1, 2}) are randomly selected from ZZp . The Cloud Server also
computes
~π = (π1 , π2 ) = ((1, g r11 v −r21 ), (1, g r12 v −r22 )).
and sends (~c, ~π ) as the response to the TPA.
TPA then verifies the response sent by the Cloud Server by checking the equality
of
~c •

1

g

!

1 v −1

= ιT (tT )(~u • ~π )

(5.6)

where tT represents the right hand side of Equation (5.5) and ιT denotes the following
transformation:
tT →

1

1

1 tT

!
.

The “•” operation is defined as follows: define a function
F ((x1 , x2 ), (y1 , y2 )) =

e(x1 , y1 ) e(x1 , y2 )

!

e(x2 , y1 ) e(x2 , y2 )

for (x1 , x2 ) ∈ G21 and (y1 , y2 ) ∈ G22 , and the “•” operation is defined as
~x • ~y = F (x1 , y1 )F (x2 , y2 ).
Correctness. To verify Equation (5.6),
!
!
1 g
e(c11 , 1) e(c11 , g)
Left = ~c •
=
1 v −1
e(c12 , 1) e(c12 , g)
Right = ιT (tT )F (u1 , π1 )F (u2 , π2 )
!
!
1 1
1 e(u, g r11 v −r21 )
=
1 tT
1 e(uα , g r11 v −r21 )

1

e(c21 , 1) e(c21 , v −1 )
e(c22 , 1) e(c22 , v −1 )

e(uτ , g r12 v −r22 )

1 e(uτ α , g r12 v −r22 )

and we have
e(c11 , 1)e(c21 , 1) = 1 = 1 · 1 · 1

!

!

5.4. A New RIC Protocol with IND-Privacy

49

e(c12 , 1)e(c22 , 1) = 1 = 1 · 1 · 1
e(c11 , g)e(c21 , v −1 ) = e(ur11 +r12 τ , g) · e(ur21 +r22 τ , v −1 )
= e(u, g r11 )e(ur21 , v −1 )e(uτ , g r12 )e(uτ , v −r22 )
= e(ur11 +τ r12 , g)e(ur21 +τ r22 , v −1 )
0

e(c12 , g)e(c22 , v −1 ) = e(uα(r11 +r12 τ ) σ, g)e(uα(r21 +r22 τ ) uµ , v −1 )
0

= e(uα(r11 +r12 τ ) , g)e(uα(r21 +r22 τ ) , v −1 )e(σ, g)e(uµ , v −1 )
= tT e(uαr11 , g)e(uαr12 τ , g)e(uαr21 , v −1 )e(uαr22 τ , v −1 )
= tT e(uα , g r11 v −r21 )e(uατ , g r12 v −r22 )

5.4.1

IND-Privacy of Our New Scheme

Below we show that our new RIC protocol has the IND-Privacy under the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption [29]. Let gk = (λ, p, G1 , G2 ,
GT , e, g1 , g2 ) define a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT where gb is a generator of Gb
for b = {0, 1}. The SXDH assumption holds if for any polynomial time algorithm
A and any b ∈ {1, 2} we have
| Pr[x, y ← ZZ∗p : A(gk, gbx , gby , gbxy ) = 1] − Pr[x, y, r ← ZZ∗p : A(gk, gbx , gby , gbr ) = 1]| ≤ 
where  is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Theorem 5.1 Our new RIC protocol has IND-Privacy if the SXDH problem is hard.
Proof: Let A denote an adversary who has a non-negligible advantage  in winning
the IND game, we construct another algorithm B which can solve the SXDH problem
also with a non-negligible probability.
B receives a challenge gk, A = ux , B = uy , C = uz where gk = (p, G1 , G2 , GT ,
e, u, g) and z is either xy or a random element ξ in ZZp . B sets up the IND game for
A as follows
1. B uses the information in gk to generate all the systems parameters and public/private keys as described in Wang et al.’s TPA scheme (Sec. 5.3.2).
2. B also sets the values of the commitment key ~u = (u1 , u2 ) in our scheme as
u1 = (u, A) and u2 = (B, C).
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Upon receiving the two files F0 and F1 from A, B simulates the game as follows.
B generates a random file identifier name and the file tag t = namekSSigssk (name),
(0)

and uses name and the secret key x to compute the authenticators {σi } (for F0 )
(1)

and {σi } (for F1 ) honestly. After that, B tosses a random coin b ← {0, 1}, and
sends the file tag t back to A. Upon receiving the challenge chal from A, B computes
µ00 , µ01 , and the corresponding aggregated authenticators σ (0) and σ (1) honestly. B
then generates the response to A as follows.
1. Randomly choose r11 , r12 , r21 , r22 from ZZp .
0

2. Compute c11 = ur11 B r12 , c12 = Ar11 C r12 σ (b) , c21 = ur21 B r22 , c22 = Ar21 C r22 uµb .
3. Compute ~π = (π1 , π2 ) = ((1, g r11 v −r21 ), (1, g r12 v −r22 )).
B then sends the response (~c, ~π ) to A. If A outputs b0 such that b0 = b, then B
outputs 1; otherwise B outputs 0.
Case 1: z = xy. In this case, the distribution of the response (~c, ~π ) is identically
to that of a real response, and hence we have
Pr[b0 = b] = 1/2 + .
Case 2: z = ξ. In this case, the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding. That
is, for a valid proof (~c, ~π ) satisfying equation 5.6, it can be expressed as a proof for
0

0

0
0
0
0
)), or a proof for (uµ1 , σ1 ) (with random, r22
, r21
, r12
(uµ0 , σ0 ) (with randomness (r11
1
1
1
1
ness (r11
, r12
, r21
, r22
)). Therefore, we have

Pr[b0 = b] = 1/2.
Combining both cases, we have
Pr[B(gk, ux , uy , uxy ) = 1)] − Pr[B(gk, ux , uy , uξ ) = 1)]
= Pr[b0 = b|z = xy] − Pr[b0 = b|z = ξ]
= .

5.4.2

Soundness of the Protocol

Having shown the IND feature of the protocol, we have seen that adversary A cannot
distinguish the file that has been used by the cloud server in an RIC proof. The
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remaining task is to prove the “soundness” of the protocol. We say a protocol is
sound if it is infeasible for the cloud server to change a file without being caught by
the TPA in an auditing process. We formally define the soundness games between
a simulator B and an adversary A (i.e. the cloud server) as follows.
• Key Generation. B generates a user key pair (sk, pk) by running KeyGen, and
then provides pk to A.
• Phase 1. A can now interact with B and make at most ` Token Generation
queries. In each query, A sends a file Fi = {mi1 , mi2 , · · · , min }(1 ≤ i ≤ `) to
B, which responds with the corresponding file tag ti and authentication tokens
φi = {σij } (1 ≤ j ≤ n).
• Phase 2. A outputs a file F ∗ and a file tag t∗ such that t∗ = ti but F ∗ 6= Fi
for an i ∈ [1, `] (i.e. at least one message block of Fi has been modified by A).
B then plays the role as the verifier and executes the RIC protocol with A by
sending a challenge chal∗ = {j, νj } which contains at least one index j such
that F ∗ differs from Fi in the j-th message block.
• Decision. Based on the proof P ∗ computed by A, B makes a decision which is
either True or False.
Definition 5.2 We say a witness indistinguishable RIC protocol is -sound if
Pr[B outputs True] ≤ .
Below we prove that our RIC protocol is sound under the co-CDH assumption.
Let (p, G1 , G2 , GT , e, g1 , g) be the systems parameters defined as above where e :
G1 × G2 → GT is a bilinear map. Let ψ : G2 → G1 denote an efficiently computable
isomorphism such that ψ(g) = g1 .
Computational co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) Problem on (G1 , G2 ): Given
g1 , u ∈ G1 and g, g a ∈ G2 as input where g1 and g are generators of G1 and G2
respectively, a is randomly chosen from ZZp , and u is randomly chosen from G1 ,
compute ua ∈ G1 .
Theorem 5.2 The proposed witness indistinguishable RIC protocol is negl(λ)-sound,
where negl(λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ, if the co-CDH
problem is hard.
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Our proof is by contradiction. We show that if there exists an adversary

A that can win the soundness game with a non-negligible probability, then we can
construct another adversary B which can solve the co-CDH problem also with a
non-negligible probability.
According to the soundness game, F ∗ = {m∗1 , m∗2 , · · · , m∗n } must be different
from the original file Fi = {m1 , m2 , · · · , mn } associated with t∗ (or ti ). That means
there must exist an i ∈ [1, n] such that m∗i 6= mi . Below we show that if A can pass
P
the verification for µ∗ where µ∗ = i∈I νi m∗i and at lease one of {m∗i }i∈I is modified
by A, then B can solve the co-CDH problem.
B is given an instance of the co-CDH problem (g1 , u, g, g x ) where g1 and g are
generators of G1 and G2 respectively such that ψ(g) = g1 , and u is a random
element in G1 . B’s goal is to compute ux ∈ G1 . B honestly generates the signing
key pair (spk, ssk), α, τ ∈ ZZp and the commitments key u1 = (u, uα ), u2 = (uτ , uτ α )
according to the protocol specification. B also sets g x as value of v in the user public
key, but the value of x is unknown to B. B then simulates the game as follows.
Phase 1: B answers A’s queries in Phase 1 as follows. To generate a file tag
ti for a file Fi , B first chooses name at random and generates the file tag ti =
namekSSigssk (name). For each block mj (1 ≤ j ≤ n) in Fi , B chooses at random
rj ∈R ZZp and programs the random oracle
r

H(Wj ) = g1j /umj .
B then computes
r

σj = (H(Wj )umj )x = (g1j )x = (ψ(v))ri .
It is easy to verify that σj is a valid authenticator with regards to mj .
Phase 2: Suppose A outputs a response P ∗ = (~c, ~π ) for t∗ , {m∗i }i∈I and challenges
{νi }i∈I where at least one m∗i has been modified by the adversary. Denote µ∗ =
P
∗
i∈I νi mi .
P
Let µ = i∈I νi mi and σ = Πi∈I σiνi denote the original file and authenticator
that satisfy
Y
e(σ, g) = e(( H(Wi )νi )uµ , v).

(5.7)

i∈I

B then uses the value of τ , which is used to generate the commitment key ~u, to
∗

obtain σ ∗ = c12 /cα11 and uµ = c22 /cα21 from the commitment ~c = (c1 , c2 ). Since P ∗
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can pass the verification, from Equation 5.6 we have
Y
∗
e(σ ∗ , g) = e(( H(Wi )νi )uµ , v).

(5.8)

i∈I

From Equation 5 and Equation 6, we can obtain
∗ −µ

e(σ ∗ /σ, g) = e(uµ

, v).

Since B chooses the challenges νi randomly, with overwhelming probability 1 − 1/p,
P
P
µ∗ = i∈I νi m∗i 6= i∈I νi mi = µ, and hence B can obtain
1

ux = (σ ∗ /σ) µ∗ −µ .

5.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, we studied a new desirable security notion called IND-Privacy for
remote data integrity checking protocols for cloud storage. We showed that several
well-known RIC protocols cannot provide this property, which could render the
privacy of user data exposed in an auditing process. We then proposed a new RIC
protocol which can provide IND-Privacy. Our construction is based on an efficient
Witness Indistinguishable Proof of Knowledge system. In addition, we also proved
the soundness of the newly proposed protocol, which means the cloud server cannot
modify the user data without being caught by the third party auditor in an auditing
process.

Chapter 6
Conclusion

6.1

What Have We Done

In this thesis, we have presented a comprehensive study on RIC. We started by
giving some preliminary knowledge and tools which are utilised in this thesis, and
provided a brief overview on the related work such as PDP, POR and POW along
with a revisit of current RIC schemes. The major contributions of this work lie
in the new discoveries including a comprehensive analysis on a well-known RIC
scheme [44] and introduction of the new notion of IND-privacy. In the former one,
as described in Chapter 4 we described two attack scenarios to show that the RIC
schemes proposed in [44] are flawed. This discovery is significant as it implies that
all existing RIC schemes based on the Shacham-Waters POR scheme [42] will have
the same problems.
In the latter one, as presented in Chapter 5, we defined the formal model of
Instinguishability and IND-privacy. This is for the first time that IND-privacy is
formally studied in RIC protocols. We found that the existing RIC schemes cannot
hold the IND-Privacy, which means that the IND-distinguisher is able to differentiate
two different files from the RIC proof of the cloud server. Unfortunately, this problem
has never been found in the previous study of RIC. We found that IND-privacy can
be achieved with Witness Indistinguishable (WI) proofs. The method to adopt WI
proofs is to mask the RIC proof with the commitment scheme introduced by Groth
and Sahai [29]. Their WI proofs for pairing groups were utilised in our RIC schemes.
We show that Wang et al.’s RIC protocol [44] indeed captures the IND-privacy when
our technique has been applied.
Our finding of IND-privacy provides a new tool to cloud security. We predict
that this tool will be widely adopted in analysis of cloud security protocols, beside
RIC protocols.
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Future Work

We believe that our new notion of RIC privacy can also be applied to other related
protocols such as PDP, POW and POR. It is worth exploring.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, it is still an open problem of how to design a zero
knowledge public auditing protocol that can present offline guessing attacks. We
will leave it as our future work.
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